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Résumé / Abstract 
 
La plantation de forêts est une manière peu coûteuse pour certains pays de remplir leurs 
engagements à l’égard du Protocole de Kyoto et de ses extensions éventuelles. Les marchés 
pour les permis d’émissions peuvent s’assortir de crédits pour la séquestration de carbone. 
Tant les nouvelles que les anciennes forêts sont exposées aux incendies et aux invasions de 
parasites, qui peuvent se donner lieu à l’émission d’importantes quantités de gaz carbonique à 
intervalles irréguliers. Les marchés des permis et les marchés d’assurance, mis en œuvre dans 
un cadre de comptabilité verte, peuvent rendre plus efficace et plus attrayant un système de 
crédits pour séquestration du carbone. 
 





Afforestation is a cost-effective way for some countries to meet part of their commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol and its eventual extensions. Credits for carbon sequestration can be 
mediated through markets for emissions permits. Both new and old forests are subject to 
pestilence and fire, which are events that could release substantial, discrete quantities of 
carbon at irregular intervals. Permits markets, the use of green accounting, and insurance 
markets for sudden emmisions could increase the efficiency of the scheme and its 
attractiveness to potential participants. 
 
Keywords: carbon credit, forest, insurance, green accounting, accidental 
loss. 
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Considerable quantities of carbon are contained in the world’s forests. As trees grow, they
absorb or ﬁx a quantity of carbon which is proportional to the growth of their biomass.
This observation has led many to observe that increasing the area devoted to forests, or the
stock of timber in existing forests, could be a method to mitigate the increase of atmospheric
carbon dioxide (CO2), a greenhouse gas.
The potential contribution of forests and forest products to the reduction in CO2 emis-
sions will fail to materialize unless actions to realize it are properly rewarded. Any country
which increases its forest base, improves its forestry practice, or modiﬁes its forest-product
mix should receive carbon credits under the Kyoto Protocol on global warming and its even-
tual extensions beyond 2012. A simple way to accord such credits could be to observe the
net growth of biomass in the country and to credit the current value of carbon ﬁxing to that
growth. This value, p(t) at some time t, could be determined in various ways depending
on policies adopted. If df /dt is the growth of biomass, then the credit for biomass changes
could be p(t)df /dt.
We would argue that the development of appropriate institutions to make the best use
of potential resources in an uncertain world requires that appropriate values p(t), for all
future values of t, for atmospheric carbon be established. The preferred way to do so is
through economic instruments, either a carbon tax covering all emissions of CO2 or tradeable
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permits for all emissions of CO2 into the atmosphere. Such instruments would provide
direct incentives to reduce emissions to societal standards at the least social cost. The
determination of such levels would involve the methods of green accounting for carbon,
informed by scientiﬁc understanding of the eﬀects of atmospheric carbon and of carbon
assimilation by forests, as all of these develop. For instance, the setting of a Pigovian carbon
tax (a unit tax equal to the marginal cost of emissions to society) would demand the same
types of evaluation of the social cost of the marginal unit of carbon as in determining the
cost of carbon in the green accounts. Alternatively, the appropriate number of emissions
permits would be set in order to balance at the margin the costs of atmospheric carbon and
t h ec o s to fr e d u c i n gi ti nt h el e a s t - c o s tw a y .
As a forest grows, there is a continuing risk of destruction by ﬁre or deterioration due to
pests. Such events release carbon immediately into the atmosphere, and should be recognized
explicitly as possible results of an aﬀorestation program. The eﬃcient way of minimizing
the risks of such events is the provision of appropriate levels of insurance. Indeed, under
conditions of uncertainty, two types of economic market would reinforce each other in an
international carbon-ﬁxing program: (1) insurance against damages and (2) emissions trad-
ing. Since CO2 is widely dispersed from any source on the globe, these two instruments
could be organized as globally integrated markets, further increasing their joint eﬃciency.
It is our view that a permits market could most readily be integrated globally, and so we
stress this instrument over taxes, which may (be expected to) show international variation.
The insurance market would both beneﬁt from and contribute to the improvement of green
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accounting, and hence from wider environmental policy.
2 The Value of Fixing Carbon
We consider an aﬀorestation program in the sense of the IPCC (2000, p. 6), namely, ‘the
establishment of forest on land that has been without forest for a period of time (e.g., 20-50
years or more) and was previously under a diﬀerent land use.’ Let the program begin at time
t1,w h i c hw en o r m a l i z et oz e r o ;t h enth rotation, n ≥ 0 begin at time tn;a n dt h eh a r v e s t i n g
age for the nth rotation be Tn.T h u s ,t h enth rotation will be harvested at time tn + Tn.
Any rotation can end either by harvesting at time tn + Tn or with a destructive event
at some time t<t n + Tn.A ta n yi n s t a n tt<t n + Tn, the destruction of the forest, due to
a ﬁre (an example analyzed by Reed 1984) or a pestilence that will totally ruin the forest,
can be represented as having a hazard rate, ρ. In general, the hazard rate may vary with
the age of trees or other factors but, in order to avoid notational clutter, we assume that ρ
is constant. In this case, the probability of the nth rotation’s surviving to time t is e−ρ(t−tn)
and the probability of a ﬁre on the interval (t,t + dt) is ρe−ρ(t−tn)dt.Apartial destruction of
the forest, by ﬁre or infestation by pests, can also be represented as having the hazard rate
π on any interval (t,t + dt), with a destruction of a fraction φ ∈ (0,1) of the forest, so that
(1 − φ)f (t) remains thereafter. Again, the parameters π and φ may vary, but for simplicity
of exposition we assume they are constant.
Let the quantity of carbon ﬁx e di nt h eb i o m a s so ft h ef o r e s t( a ne v e n - a g e ds t a n d )a tt i m e
t be f (t − tn); then the rate of growth is df (t − tn)/dt = ˙ f (t − tn).T h i s r a t e o f g r o w t h
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abstracts from the possibility of partial damages during the rotation. If the forest survives to
age Tn, it is cut. A fraction λn is useful and (1 − λn) is waste, immediately being transformed
into carbon dioxide (say by burning or rapid decay); this ratio is determined by the choice of
inputs (recovery eﬀort) as well as by the production mix (e.g. the proportion of construction
products relative to paper in output). The part which is useful is transformed into a mix of
wood products, the proportion of each product i being Γni,a n di t sr a t eo fd e c a yγni (again,
assumed to be constant). In what follows, in order to keep the notation simpler, we assume
that output is one-dimensional: Γni = Γ =1and γni = γn.
In this analysis we make strong abstractions from reality. We neglect changes in carbon
content in soils as forestry operations proceed. We simplify the types of stochastic damages
to forests. We consider only one type of ﬁnal product. The assumptions we are making for
the sake of simplicity of presentation do not aﬀect the conceptual basis for our proposals.
It is true, though, that the details of the probability distributions and the actual values of
parameters would be more complicated than in this presentation, and in turn the formulae
to be used in practice and hence the actual accounting for and implementation of credits
would be more complicated. In any policy application, the eﬀects of all of these features
must be estimated in as great detail as possible and then given economic values.
Green accounting is the method of assigning accounting values to environmental eﬀects
that are not mediated in markets. Analyses of the social costs of atmospheric carbon at
various dates, as is currently being done by many researchers, will inform the setting of
the number of emissions permits at any time. For example, in a life-cycle model, Haripriya
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(2001a) discusses how to account for changes in carbon content of various wood products in
India, classiﬁed into retention periods that are ‘very short’, ‘short’, ‘medium’ and ‘long’.
As advances such as this are made, the eﬀe c t i v e n e s so ft h ep o l i c yw ep r o p o s ew i l li n c r e a s e .
We emphasize that any other method of crediting carbon sequestration would also have to
deal with all of these complications. Below we shall comment on the implications of our full
set of proposals for the evaluation of realistic parameters.
The price of an emissions permit (or the unit tax) is the accounting value, p(t).W ew r i t e
the value as a function of time because the value is expected to increase through time as
cumulated emissions increase (Sohngen and Mendelsohn 2001).
It is well-known that the introduction of carbon credits can inﬂuence the rotation period
(cf. Ariste and Lasserre, 2000). In this paper we assume that the rotation periods Tn are
known (decided optimally or non-optimally, given the institutions of society) and we do not
analyze the inﬂuence of the instruments we are discussing on the rotation period, much less
the optimal rotation period. As argued by Dasgupta and Mäler (2000), green accounting
can be done even if current social standards do not attain the optimal levels. Indeed, it is
in exactly these conditions that green accounting is useful.
The stock of carbon stored in a forest is a type of capital and ﬂows such as f (t) are
a type of investment. In this context, Cairns and Lasserre (2001) show that there are
two possible ways of evaluating the carbon credit for a country at any time t ≥ 0,g i v e n
the value of a unit of emissions p(t).T h eﬁrst method evaluates (1) the interest on (using
appropriate risk-adjusted interest rates) and the depreciation of the stock value of the carbon
5Reinforcing Economic Incentives for Carbon Credits for Forests
currently sequestered in the forest and (2) the depreciation of the stock value of carbon
contained in previously produced forest products. It involves imputing and capitalizing
(present valuing) future ﬂows over an uncertain future and then calculating the rates of
change of the capitalized values. In the case of carbon sequestration, credit would be given
(immediately) for the present value of carbon to be sequestered, through all future rotations,
of a reforestation program. As has been pointed out by scholars studying the green accounts,
computing the stock values would be a formidable task. Thinking about performing such
an exercise does point up that the problem of correctly accounting for the forest involves
much more than simply crediting a country for the rate of growth of its forests. Any loss of
forest value, such as through forest ﬁres or pests, should be considered a debit to be made
up otherwise.
The second method, which is theoretically equivalent to the ﬁrst but in practice far
simpler, involves measuring only current ﬂows of value (interest on and depreciation of
stocks), at current prices, rather than ﬁrst computing stock values (as present values of ﬂows
evaluated at future prices) and taking a time derivative. This method is what is envisaged
in most theoretical treatments of green net product. Let δs
m, m<n , index those rotations
in the past that have survived to maturity and been harvested. That is to say, δs
m is one if
rotation m survived and zero if not. Similarly, let δp
m index rotations in which there was a
partial destruction (so that δp
m =0if there was no partial destruction). The credit at time
t ∈ (tn,t n + Tn) (i.e., for times strictly between planned harvests) is given by the formula,
C (t)=p(t)
(h
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In this formula the credit C (t) involves only physical changes occurring at the current
instant t, evaluated at the current price p(t), as determined by the current price of carbon
permits, for example. In case of a total destruction occurring at time t, there is an immediate
release of a quantity f (t − tn) of carbon to the atmosphere. This event occurs with hazard
rate ρ, and results in the appearance of the term ρf (t − tn) in the formula for the carbon
credit. A new rotation starts right after the destruction, so that n is increased to n +1 ;
and the beginning of the new rotation is set at tn+1 = t. The possibility of a partial
destruction is responsible for the appearance of the term πφf (t − tn). In this case, a fraction
(1 − φ)f (t − tn) of the forest remains; for simplicity, we assume that the damaged forest is
left to grow but other practices may be possible. The ﬁnal term, under the summation sign,
is the reduction in the credit for decay of forest products in previous rotations, m<n .
The green accounting at time t for the carbon credit of a forest, C (t),i sd i ﬀerent from
the two possible ways for accounting for the value of a harvest discussed by Cairns (2001).
In that model, of a commercial forest in which all beneﬁts were received at the harvest date,
the value of the forest could be accounted either (1) as occurring at the point of harvest as is
current practice, or else (2) as growing at the rate of interest (not the rate of growth of the
biomass) through the rotation period. In the formula, the value of carbon ﬁxation, C (t),i s
actually obtained by society in each year, and is so evaluated (at the rate of growth of the
biomass, f (t)) in the green accounts. Distinct types of beneﬁt provided by the forest give
rise to diﬀerent methods of green accounting.
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3 Carbon Credit Implementation Scheme
The second method of evaluation suggests the following policy for distribution of carbon
credits to nations and through them to local decision-making units:
1. At dates t strictly between planned harvests, when the age of the stand is t−tn, impute
ac r e d i to ft h ev a l u eo fc a r b o nﬁxing through actual forest growth, p(t) ˙ f(t − tn).
2. At dates t when a complete destruction occurs, impose a debit of p(t)f(t − tn),a n d
when a partial destruction occurs, impose a debit of φp(t)f (t − tn)
3. At all dates, for each past harvest m<nimpute a debit for the value of the current
decay of forest products, δs
mf (Tm)λm (1 − δp
m)γmp(t)e−γm(t−tm−Tm).
4. At the time of harvest, impute a discrete debit for the value of waste,
(1 − λn)(1− δp
n)f (Tn)p(tn + Tn).
5. Make no imputation for future harvests, m>n . Future harvests are not evaluated
until they are actually planted.
There is no calculation of present value in any of these steps. Rather, the policy consists
in crediting current forest growth while ignoring risks of ﬁre or infestation (item 1), and
charging instead the full loss from any ﬁre or infestation when it occurs (item 2). A beneﬁt
of this scheme is that there is a very strong incentive to take the optimal actions to reduce
the risk of ﬁre and pestilence.
A major problem with the policy is that, unlike for the imputation of the value of waste
at time tn + Tn, there is no cash revenue against which the charge for ﬁre or pestilence can
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be levied. In fact, the country or ﬁrm that is liable for the charge would lose the value
of environmental amenities and the prospective value of the harvest as well as the value
of carbon sequestration. The sudden, discrete cash outﬂow may entail hardships for some
countries or ﬁr m s ,r e q u i r i n gt h e mt og ot ob o t hc a p i t a la n dp e r m i t sm a r k e t st oc o v e rt h e
cost of the release of the carbon. If these countries or ﬁrms are risk averse, and the cost of
the adverse event is levied on them, the prospect of such a requirement could reduce their
incentive to invest in forests to sequester carbon.
If ﬁres and pestilence on the planet are not correlated, however, insurance markets could
develop to spread these risks. Being able to insure against sudden, discrete costs would
give smaller countries and also ﬁrms a greater incentive to maintain forests, and thereby
would encourage the use of what we have argued may be a low-cost method of reducing
atmospheric concentrations of carbon. Some countries with a large land area may be able to
self-insure, but even they may ﬁnd it eﬃcient to use the insurance markets. The fact that
carbon emissions are dispersed fairly uniformly throughout the globe, and are not localized,
implies that the price of permits, p(t), will become equalized throughout the world in an
international permits market. With an international price, the insurance market can become
international, and the resulting international diversiﬁcation will increase the eﬃciency of the
insurance market by making it ‘thicker’.
Implementing an insurance market would entail modifying the above scheme, not from
the point of view of global society as a whole but from the point of view of individual
decision-making units. Our decentralized method would change item 2 above as follows.
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1. An additional deduction, in the form of an insurance premium of (ρ + πφ)p(t)f (t − tn),
would be imposed at dates t strictly between planned harvests.
2. In case of ﬁre or pestilence, no carbon debit would be imputed to the individual forest.
Rather, the insurance company would pay the tax or provide the required permits: in
the case of complete destruction, for example, the insuror would pay p(t)f (t − tn) to
provide f (t − tn) permits to oﬀset the release of CO2.
The net gain to the ﬁrm (country) at any time t is C (t), exactly as in the green accounting
of the formula above.
As we have mentioned above, important issues in this insurance scheme are the treatment
of all of the sources of complication of an implemented scheme, from which we have abstracted
in our conceptual presentation. In the model, this treatment reduces to the estimation of
the parameters ρ, π, φ and γ,f o rd i ﬀerent geographical regions, species, end uses and future
dates. Estimation is all the more diﬃcult if, as is likely, the values of these parameters depend
on global warming and hence on the success of eﬀorts to reduce it, including the credits
and insurance we have been discussing. There has also been some question concerning the
quantity of carbon a forest can absorb. But insurance companies with a ﬁnancial interest
would have a greater incentive than any disinterested government or international institution
to determine more accurate values for those parameters, as well as to anticipate the future
values of carbon in the atmosphere, [p(t)]
∞
t=0. In fact, the insurance companies would have the
incentive to contribute to the estimation of these parameters, thereby contributing to optimal
management both directly through research directed to their own interest and indirectly
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through more accurate values of carbon for the green accounts.
Our development points up some further issues. One of the main beneﬁts of our proposal
is that the three economic instruments, namely tradeable permits, insurance markets for risk
and green accounting, reinforce each other. Better estimations of insurance risk require and
lead to better estimates of the value of permits, and a more eﬃc i e n tm a r k e tf o rp e r m i t sl e a d s
to better estimates of the costs and value of insurance. Incentives are aligned more eﬀectively.
By reinforcing each other, the instruments help to integrate markets internationally as well,
further increasing eﬃciency.
The beneﬁts of insurance are substantial, especially if there are actors inclined not to
uphold their agreements. If a private company can go bankrupt or if a country can default
on the restitution required by the credit scheme, it may be induced to take on too much
risk, investing in forests that are too risky to be socially worthwhile. Having insurance
available would reduce such incentives. Inducing transnational insurance companies in the
private sector to take part in the mechanism would require a high degree of transparency of
the scheme. But, once the companies were conﬁdent enough to participate, their presence
and actions would increase transparency and likely improve enforcement and stability of
the mechanism. Green accounting and the insurance market would also make it easier for
outsiders to determine whether a given investment was eﬃcient or not. Even if a ﬁrm did not
take insurance, in normal years (with no destruction) the clearing house for credits could, at
least conceivably, reduce its credit by the value of insurance, thereby oﬀsetting the incentive
to invest in overly risky forests in order to beneﬁt from the permits. Thus, green accounting
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and the insurance market would make any ineﬃciency (such as an overly risky investment)
more obvious.
A problem with the scheme is that, as in any insurance market, there is moral hazard: the
very existence of insurance reduces the power of the incentive to manage forests optimally.
That is to say, given that it is insured the ﬁrm may be induced not to take suﬃcient steps
to avoid the hazard, with the eﬀect of increasing the parameters ρ, π and φ.M o r a lh a z a r d
aﬄicts all forms of insurance and forces insurance companies to take steps (such as variable
deductibles) to minimize the cost of the risk. In this way, the insurance market is imperfect.
Unfortunately, governments and international institutions are also subject to moral haz-
ard. If ﬁrms and countries are to make long-term commitments to planting forests, of the
order of several decades, there must be an international commitment to maintaining the
scheme — if not to the prices themselves, at least to the methods of computing the prices. A
part of this commitment includes one to improving methods of green accounting. Methods
of accounting, transparency, credits and insurance feed back upon themselves to produce
more credible values of p, ρ, π,a n dφ, and hence to reduce ineﬃciencies in the system and
the ability of actors to take advantage of them.
The insurance scheme provides a diﬀerent perspective on the use of forests in climate
control. Discussion to date tends to be limited to aﬀorestation and not continuing forestation.
Since the discussion is of a uniform global problem, of CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere,
logically the scheme should not be limited to aﬀorestation. If an ancient forested area, such
as the New Forest in England or the Black Forest in Germany, suﬀered damage due to pest
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or to ﬁre, the appropriate government should be charged for the additional emissions. Such
a requirement would imply, in principle, bringing all forests in the world, not just newly
planted ones, into the permits-and-insurance scheme (except possibly for self-insurers). The
charges would provide improved incentives to managers of existing forests. In addition,
extending the market would imply a reduction in the other form of ineﬃciency in insurance
markets, adverse selection.
4 Extent of the Market
In this paper we argue that three institutions, (1) emissions trading, (2) insurance markets
for carbon in forests and (3) green accounting, can interact in organizing a system of carbon
credits for investment in forestry. We presume that the ﬁrst of these is functioning well;
the novelty is the two others and the interactions. The transaction price in the insurance
market would be determined by the general emissions trading scheme, of which we assume
forestry’s, let alone any forester’s, contribution would be so small that it would have no
discernible eﬀe c to nt h a tp r i c e .W eh a v ep r e s e n t e dt h ei n s u r a n c em a r k e ti nt h i sp a p e ra si f
it were competitive and the only imperfections were moral hazard and adverse selection.
We are arguing that the opportunities for earning credits from forestry should be extended
to all countries. Our referees remind us that markets are not perfect in developing countries,
may have to be developed, and themselves have costs. Extending the opportunities does not
eliminate all forms of risk, especially in developing countries. Nor, however, does making
insurance available increase any risk or other burden for a developing country.
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There already exist many insurance companies in the developed countries that, given a
wider emissions trading scheme, could establish the market in developing countries. We feel
that the development of insurance markets is less problematic than the prior requirement of
emissions trading or, indeed, extension of the Kyoto Protocol to developing countries.
By being able to enter the scheme and obtain credits for their forests, developing countries
would beneﬁt directly. Other countries would beneﬁt by the reduction in the price of credits
occasioned by the increase in supply. There is a cost to developing a market, as with any
product, but that cost will in the ﬁrst instance be borne by the insurance companies, who
will expect to recover it later in the insurance premium. Even with these premia, there will
be a net reduction in the full cost perceived by participating countries because the market
for forest credits will become more credible and the risk less onerous for forest owners as
a result of the introduction of insurance. Any forester that doubts that costs are reduced
by buying insurance will not buy it. In addition to a gain by those who would participate
anyway, the reduction in cost through insurance will make it possible to invest in additional
forests that are close to the margin of viability.
Another type of cost is insurance monopoly. However, as markets become thicker monopoly
becomes less sustainable. Therefore, as the scheme is extended in time and space, monopoly
will be attenuated. In any case, even the monopoly price would be an improvement on there
b e i n gn oi n s u r a n c e( o r ,i ne ﬀect, a prohibitively high price for insurance).
We have taken the forest-management regime as given, and have avoided assuming that
it is optimal. The forester chooses the rotation period, but not necessarily optimally, just as
14Reinforcing Economic Incentives for Carbon Credits for Forests
a commercial forest may be harvested at an inopportune (sub-optimal) time; in that case,
proﬁts are not maximized, but the forester obtains the market price for what is harvested
and for the credits earned up to then. If the carbon is emitted prior to the expected time, the
charge is imposed prior to the expected time. There is room for improvement of management
regimes and a consequent increase in sequestration and credits for any given plot of land,
as well as other beneﬁts. Haripriya (2001b) discusses the fact that better management of
forest lands and forests would provide developing countries with additional beneﬁts, beyond
the sequestration of carbon. All countries will surely take into account all aspects of their
forestry regime in their decisions, and not solely the beneﬁts to be had from sequestering
carbon. A more eﬃcient recognition of carbon sequestration will increase these perceived
beneﬁts and lead countries to make more appropriate trade-oﬀs in management.
In a sense, the (value of the) credit is only loaned to the forester while the carbon is still
ﬁxed. Sequestration is temporary, since any given, stored carbon molecule will eventually
escape to the atmosphere in the form of CO2 in one of the ways we have enumerated. Indeed,
our scheme loosens a perceived need for permanence (somehow deﬁned) of storage within
a particular forest or limited geographical area. From any planted forest, world society
gains a temporary beneﬁt in that there is less CO2 in the atmosphere for a period and the
forester gains a temporary credit, paid back when the carbon re-enters the atmosphere. The
reason is that intertemporal diﬀerences in the value of funds (at market rates of interest) are
exploited. The components of our scheme can be compared to (1) bank interest on funds
that will eventually be withdrawn, (2) deposit insurance and (3) a readily available estimate
15Reinforcing Economic Incentives for Carbon Credits for Forests
of future inﬂation, taxation and so on. The bank does not hold the funds permanently.
Still, there are gains to the bank and to the depositor from the transaction. In the case of
carbon ﬁxing, there is a gain to society even if the carbon is stored only temporarily, and
the intertemporal pricing helps the parties to realize that gain. It is not essential to the
scheme, then, that on a global basis the total stock of carbon sequestered increase until a
stationary state is approximated, even though we do expect such a trajectory. Since there is
an important role for the future price, detailed green accounting of physical changes and their
values as well as the predictions of insurance companies are vital elements of the scheme.
5C o n c l u s i o n
An eﬃcient aﬀorestation policy can contribute to eﬀorts to mitigate the greenhouse eﬀect.
Economic instruments can help to make that policy more eﬀective and to minimize the costs
of global warming. The most commonly discussed such instruments are unit carbon taxes
or (what we have emphasized) tradeable emissions permits. Other economic instruments
discussed in this paper are insurance markets and green accounting. In conditions of un-
certainty, all of these instruments reinforce e a c ho t h e ra sw e l la se n c o u r a g em o r ed i r e c t e d
scientiﬁc and economic research on global warming and environmental policy in general. The
reinforcement and strengthening are especially encouraged in global markets for insurance
and carbon credits.
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